

# Afshin Nikzad

afshin.nikzad@gmail.com  
<http://afshin-nikzad.com>

RESEARCH INTERESTS     Market and Mechanism Design  
                                 Matching Markets, Information Design

POSITIONS                 Assistant Professor of Economics, USC, 2019-present  
                                 Research Member, Simons Laufer Mathematical Sciences Institute, 2023  
                                 Visiting Researcher, UC Berkeley, 2023  
                                 Visiting Scholar, Becker Friedman Institute, UChicago, 2022  
                                 Visiting Scientist, Simons Institute, UC Berkeley 2019  
                                 Postdoctoral Scholar, UC Berkeley, 2018-2019

EDUCATION                Stanford University, 2012-2018  
                                 Ph.D. in Economics  
                                 Ph.D. in Operations Research  
  
                                 Carnegie Mellon University, 2010-2012  
                                 M.Sc. in Algorithms, Combinatorics, Optimization  
  
                                 Sharif University of Technology, 2006-2010  
                                 B.Sc. in Computer Science

JOURNAL PAPERS        “Optimal Allocation via Waitlists: Simplicity through Information Design” with Itai Ashlagi and Faidra Monachou.  
**The Review of Economic Studies**; 2024.

                                 “Equity in Dynamic Matching: Extreme Waitlist Policies” with Philipp Strack.  
**Management Science**, 2023

                                 “On Rank Dominance of Tie-Breaking Rules” with Maxwell Allman and Itai Ashlagi.  
**Theoretical Economics**, 2023

                                 “Matching in Dynamic Imbalanced Markets” with Itai Ashlagi and Philipp Strack  
**The Review of Economic Studies**, 2022

                                 “Global Kidney Chains” Afshin Nikzad (first author) Mohammad Akbarpour, Alvin Roth, and Michael Rees. **Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences**, 2021

                                 “Rank-optimal Assignments in Uniform Markets”  
**Theoretical Economics**, 2021

                                 “Persuading a Pessimist: Simplicity and Robustness”  
**Games and Economic Behavior**, 2021

                                 “What matters in tie-breaking rules? How competition guides design” with Itai Ashlagi  
Preliminary version in EC’16, **Journal of Economic Theory**, 2020

“Approximate Random Allocation Mechanisms” with M. Akbarpour  
**The Review of Economic Studies** (2020)

“Assigning More Students to Their Top Choices: A Tiebreaking Rule Comparison” with Itai Ashlagi, Assaf Romm. Preliminary version in EC’15, **Games and Economic Behavior** (2019)

“Budget Feasible Procurement Auctions” with Nima Anari and Gagan Goel  
**Operations Research** (2018)

“Approximation Algorithms for Computing Maximin Share Allocations” with Georgios Amanatidis, Evangelos Markakis, Amin Saberi  
**ACM Transactions on Algorithms** (2017)

WORKING  
PAPERS

“Multi-criteria Allocation Mechanisms: Constraints and Comparative Statics”  
Working paper.

“Constrained Majorization: Applications in Mechanism Design”  
Extended Abstract appeared in **EC 2022**

“Thickness and Competition in On-demand Service Platforms”  
Working paper.

“Financing Transplant Costs of the Poor: A Dynamic Model of Global Kidney Exchange”  
Afshin Nikzad, Mohammad Akbarpour, Alvin Roth, and Michael Rees. Working paper.

SELECTED  
CONFERENCE  
PAPERS

“Expressiveness, Cost, and Collectivism: How the Design of Preference Languages Shapes Participation in Algorithmic Decision-Making”  
CHI 2023, with Samantha Robertson, Tonya Nguyen, Cathy Hu, Catherine Albiston, Niloufar Salehi

“Constrained Majorization: Applications in Mechanism Design”  
Economics and Computation (EC), 2022.

“Optimal Dynamic Allocation: Simplicity Through Information Design”  
Economics and Computation (EC), with Itai Ashlagi and Faidra Monachou, 2022.

“What Matters in School Choice Tie-Breaking? How Competition Guides Design”  
Economics and Computation (EC), with Itai Ashlagi, 2016.

“Reservation Exchange Markets for Internet Advertising”  
ICALP’16. with Gagan Goel, Stefano Leonardi, Vahab Mirrokni, and Renato Paes-Leme.

“Assigning more Students to Their Top Choices: A Tie-Breaking Rule Comparison”  
Economics and Computation (EC), with Itai Ashlagi and Assaf Romm, 2015.

“Approximation Algorithms for Computing Maximin Share Allocations”  
ICALP’15. with G. Amanatidis, E. Markakis, and A. Saberi.

“Mechanism Design for Crowdsourcing: An Optimal  $1-1/e$  Competitive Budget-Feasible Mechanism for Large Markets” FOCS’14, with N. Anari and G. Goel.

“Mechanism Design for Crowdsourcing Markets with Heterogeneous Tasks”  
HCOMP’14, with G. Goel and A. Singla.

“Optimal Iterative Pricing over Social Networks”  
WINE’10, with V. Mirrokni, M. Ghodsi, H. Mahini, N. Haghpanah, and H. Akhlaghpour.

AWARDS      NSF Grant DASS-2131519: “Designing & Evaluating Software Systems to Advance Equal Opportunity”  
(750K, co-PI), 2021  
Long-term visiting position, Simons Institute, 2019  
Stanford Graduate Fellowship, Hewlett-Packard Fellow, 2014-2017  
William L. Mellon Fellowship, Carnegie Mellon University, 2010-2012  
Gold Medal in Iranian National Olympiad in Informatics, 2005

TEACHING    Instructor, University of Southern California,  
    · Principles of Market Design (undergraduate level, Spring 2023, Spring 2024)  
    · Market Design (graduate level, Spring 2020, Fall 2020, Fall 2021)  
    · Research on Frontier Economics (graduate level, Fall 2021, Spring 2022)  
Instructor, UC Berkeley, 2018.  
    · Research Design and Applications for Data and Analysis.

PROFESSIONAL    Referee: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Review, American Economic  
ACTIVITIES    Review: Insights, Econometrica, Economic Theory, Journal of Economic Theory, Journal of Political  
Economy, Management Science, Mathematics of Operations Research, Operations Research, Review of  
Economic Studies, Theoretical Economics.

Google Research: Summer 2013, Summer 2014.

Member of the Scientific Committee and Contest Designer: Iranian National Olympiad in Informatics,  
2006 - 2009

#### PRESENTATIONS

2023:

- Marketplace Innovation Workshop (<https://marketplaceinnovation.net/>)
- Economics Department, University of California, San Diego
- Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley
- Simons Laufer Mathematical Sciences Institute, Berkeley
- California Institute of Technology (Caltech)
- Virtual Market Design Seminar Series (<https://virtual-md-seminar.com/>)

2022:

- Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto
- Department of Economics, Sharif University of Technology
- Paris School of Economics
- The Twenty-Third ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC)
- Department of Economics, University of Southern California
- Becker Friedman Institute, University of Chicago
- Kellogg school of management, Northwestern University

2021:

- Columbia University, conference
- Stanford University, conference
- Simons Institute, UC Berkeley, workshop
- The Twenty-Second ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC)

- . INFORMS Annual Meeting, conference

2020:

- . Penn State University, seminar

2019:

- . California Institute of Technology, seminar
- . LA Theory conference
- . UC Berkeley Haas School of Business, seminar
- . UC Berkeley Economics department, seminar
- . UC Irvine Economics department, seminar
- . USC Marshall Business School, guest lecture

2018:

- . UC Berkeley, seminar
- . Northwestern University, seminar
- . University of Southern California, seminar
- . Columbia University, seminar
- . Duke University, seminar
- . Stanford University, seminar
- . Carnegie Mellon University, seminar
- . UC San Diego, seminar
- . INFORMS Annual Meeting, conference
- . Uber Technologies Inc, seminar
- . Lyft, seminar
- . Google Research, seminar